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SME Policies of Malaysian Government: 
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Hiroshi Oikawa
1. Introduction
This paper reviews the Malaysian government＇s Small and Medium Enterprise (SME１）) 
policy from a historical perspective. Foreign flagship companies made a tremendous 
contribution to Malaysia＇s export-oriented electrical and electronics (E&E) industrialisation. 
By creating free trade zones (FTZs) and providing effective investment incentives, 
government policy was highly successful in attracting foreign companies, making Malaysia 
one of the world＇s largest semiconductor producers in the 1980s. However, after the 
impressive initial success of Malaysia＇s export-oriented industrialisation, it was gradually 
recognised that, in order to reap the full benefits to the economy, the creation of backward 
linkages between large electronics companies and local component and material suppliers 
was of critical importance - and is the central concern of this paper. Local SMEs were 
expected to play an integral role in linkage creation: how much did the government＇s SME 
support policies help them to do so?
　　In theory, if markets worked efficiently they would automatically generate an optimal 
size distribution of firms, and no government intervention would be needed. However, in 
real-world free market economies, smaller firms tend to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
larger firms in market competition and in obtaining finance, labour, technology, and 
information (Smallbone 2000, Bennett 2014). This is a form of ＂market failure,＂ in which 
large firms enjoy economies of scale that allow them to dominate SMEs, whose difficulties 
１）SMI (Small and Medium Industry), a concept similar to SME, also appeared widely, particularly in the 
early writings of Malaysian government and researchers. The terms SMI and SME were often used 
interchangeably, but the implication is slightly different. According to Karikomi (1998) and Ndubisi & 
Saleh (2006), SMI is more limited, referring to the manufacturing sectors, while SME encompasses 
various sectors including services, construction, ICT, and other economic activities. Although my focus is 
the manufacturing sector, I have used only the term SME in this paper.
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are intensified in the environment of a developing economy where there are more obstacles 
to markets functioning efficiently (Schmitz 1982, Little et al. 1987, Tambunan 2009). To 
compensate for these disadvantages, appropriate government support to SMEs is justified 
(Storey 1994, Smallbone 2000).
　　Malaysia＇s SME support policies are often seen as relatively successful (Meyanathan & 
Salleh 1994, Moha Asri 1999a, Hashim 1999, Ndubisi 2008a). Statistically, for example, the 
contribution of Malaysian SMEs to total national value-added was reported as 47.3% in 2005, 
higher than that of other Asian economies such as Thailand (38.9%), Singapore (34.7%) and 
the Philippines (32.0%), although lower than that of Indonesia (57.0%) and China (60.0%) 
(Ndubisi 2008b, 25). Some credit must be given to SME support policies. Malaysia pursued 
a laissez-faire development policy during the colonial period and in the 1960s after 
independence. During these periods, political emphasis was placed on the development of 
the traditional resource-based and export-oriented large firms, local and foreign-owned, 
and the development of local SMEs was left largely to market forces. However, in addition 
to the incentives offered to large TNCs, various types of support and incentives were 
gradually introduced to promote local SMEs.
　　This paper examines the characteristics and history of public assistance to support the 
development of local SMEs in Malaysia. The following three points will be addressed. First, 
what are the industrial characteristics of SMEs in Malaysia, as compared with large firms? 
Second, how did SME policies historically change along with the process of Malaysian 
industrialisation? Third, what types of measures were, and are, put in place to support the 
development of local SMEs? The following part of this paper examines these issues.
2. Defi nition and Characteristics of SMEs in Malaysia
　　For a long time after independence, there was no single comprehensive definition of 
SMEs in Malaysia (Moha Asri 1999a, Chin & Lim 2018). Different government agencies 
used different definitions for different purposes - which in itself is evidence that Malaysia＇s 
SME policies were planned and conducted in a rather decentralised manner. A typical 
example was when the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) introduced the 
Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) in 1975. The Act required all manufacturing enterprises 
to apply for a new license. This regulation applied to enterprises with more than 25 workers 
and paid-up capital of more than MR250,000 (this limit was raised later). Smaller companies 
were excluded from this obligation because they were recognised as economically 
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disadvantaged, and SMEs were implicitly defined as those with 25 or fewer workers.
　　However, several studies of Malaysia, involving international organisations such as the 
World Bank (1984), UNIDO (1986), and ADB (1990), adopted the following shared 
definitions:
　(1) small-scale enterprises - establishments employing less than 50 workers
　(2) medium-scale enterprises -between 50 and 199 workers, and
　(3) large-scale enterprises - more than 200 workers.
These definitions were also adopted by some individual researchers (Chee 1987 , 
Meyanathan & Salleh 1994, Moha Asri 1999a), though other definitions were used─for 
example, fewer than 100 workers as the threshold of SME classification (Fong 1990). To 
maximise comparability with earlier empirical research on Malaysia, I too follow these 
shared definitions and define SMEs as enterprises that employ fewer than 200 workers２）.
　　On this definition, it can be clearly observed that, like many other countries, Malaysia 
has a manufacturing sector that, numerically, has long been overwhelmingly made up of 
SMEs. Table 1 shows that, in 1981 for example, firms employing less than 200 workers 
accounted for nearly 98 percent of all enterprises in Malaysia＇s manufacturing sector. 
However, SMEs only employed 55 percent of the total workforce and accounted for only 47 
percent of the total value-added. Over the next 20 years, moreover, SME shares of 
employment, output, and value-added declined, implying that in Malaysia, large firms 
expanded more rapidly in all aspects of manufacturing activities than SMEs did３）.
２）Obviously, for practical purposes, having no unified definition of SMEs creates difficulties when it 
comes to formulating and implementing effective SME support policies consistently among different 
government bodies. To overcome this problem, on 9 June 2005, the National SME Development Council 
(NSDC), the highest policy-making body for facilitating the development of SMEs, approved the legal 
definition of Malaysian SMEs across the economic sectors as follows (Bank Negara Malaysia 2005, 
Ndubisi 2008a, Chin & Lim 2018):   
　(1) Manufacturing, manufacturing-related services and agro-based industries:  
　    Full-time employees not exceeding 150, or Annual sales turnover not exceeding RM25 million  
　(2) Service, primary agriculture, and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) companies:  
　    Full-time employees not exceeding 50, or annual sales turnover not exceeding RM5 million  
This definition has been adopted by all Government Ministries and Agencies in SME development. It is 
slightly different from the definition I have adopted in this paper.
３）It is possible to interpret these figures in a different way. Employment is some SMEs may have 
increased enough to push them into the category of large firms. From simply analysing these tables, it is 
impossible to infer to what extent this happened, but it is unlikely to have occurred enough to influence 
the general tendency.
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　　A second striking feature of Malaysian SME development is their skewed distribution 
across industries. Traditionally, most Malaysian SMEs were in sectors which tended to be 
labour-intensive, less-skilled, and domestic-market oriented (Meyanathan & Salleh 1994, 
26). Table 2 shows the sectoral distribution of SMEs and large firms by industry in 1981 - 
at the initial stage of Malaysian manufacturing industrialisation. As can be seen from this 
table, SMEs accounted for extremely high percentages of firms in fabricated metal (99.6%); 
machinery (99.3%); food products (98.2%); wood products (98.1%); base metal (97.9%); and 
chemical products (97.9%). Plastic parts (which are included under chemical products in 
Table 2) and metal products are the central focus of my research. These products are 
important for supporting E&E industrialisation and they are relatively easy for local TNCs 
to outsource.
　　Large firms were most frequently found in the electrical/electronics sector; their share 
of 21.8% in number of firms and 89.5% of value-added clearly shows their dominance in the 
EE industries. Thus, a dualistic industrial structure is observed, with large EE firms being 
supported by many SMEs that supply them with plastic and metal parts. For this reason, 
SME development was critical for further growth of Malaysian EE industries.
Table 1　 Percentage Share of No. of Establishments, Employment, Value of Output and Value-
Added by Employment Size of Firms in Malaysian Manufacturing Sector from 1981 to 1999
Establishments(%)
　　SME (0～199)
200 or more
TOTAL in No.
1981
   97.8
    2.2
 20,429
1993
     94.8
      5.2
   23,462
1995
     93.8
      6.2
   22,453
1997
     91.8
      8.2
   23,029
1999
     82.7
     17.3
   21,891
Employment (%)
SME (0～199)
200 or more
TOTAL in No.
   55.0
   45.0
567,500
     39.4
     60.6
1,266,727
     36.2
     63.8
1,389,545
     33.4
     66.6
1,411,447
     31.0
     69.0
1,358,176
Value of Output (%)
SME (0～199)
200 or more
TOTAL in RM mil.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
     32.4
     67.6
  167,974
     29.7
     70.3
  246,923
     27.6
     72.4
  297,130
     24.2
     75.8
  361,389
Value Added (%)
SME (0～199)
200 or more
TOTAL in RM mil.
   46.9
   53.1
  4,774
     31.0
     69.0
   44,207
     28.8
     71.2
   59,629
     25.1
     74.9
   79,173
     24.9
     75.1
   87,790
(Source) JICA (2003), originally from Department of Statistics (DOS) Malaysia (various issues)
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　　A third feature of Malaysian SMEs is the ethnic structure of the country＇s industrial 
distribution. Table 3 shows employment and paid-up capital by industry and ethnic group 
as of the end of 1982, including both SMEs and large enterprises. In terms of paid-up 
capital, Bumiputera-owned companies were concentrated in domestic-market-oriented and/
or low-technology sectors, such as transport equipment (mainly repair work), food 
processing, and wood production. By contrast, supporting industries for electronics 
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industrialisation such as plastic, fabricated metal, and base metal were largely controlled by 
Chinese-Malaysians. Such an ethnically divided industrial structure was an initial economic 
condition of Malaysia＇s export-oriented industrialisation, and had significant implications, 
and created limitations, for future SME support policies.
　　As described above, the Malaysian manufacturing sector suffered from several 
structural problems from the viewpoint of SME development. First, although SMEs 
dominated the Malaysian manufacturing sector in terms of number of firms, their 
substantive contribution to the national economy─in employment, output, and value-added
─has been much smaller and has declined. Second, at the initial stage of Malaysian 
industrial development, SMEs were of marginal importance, especially in relation to the 
strategic sectors such as electrical/electronics to which large TNCs made a significant 
contribution. Third, the distribution of industries was ethnically skewed, with the key 
sectors supporting export-oriented industrialisation largely controlled by Chinese-
Malaysians, while Bumiputera-owned companies were concentrated in domestic-market-
oriented sectors, and almost entirely disconnected from exporting industries.
　　As discussed further below, these features reflect Malaysia＇s historical industrial policy. 
Prior to the introduction of NEP, Malaysian SMEs were largely unsupported. Even after the 
launch of an export-oriented industrialisation strategy, SME development policy remained 
secondary and marginal. The development of SMEs lagged considerably behind that of large 
enterprises. It was only after the establishment of the Small and Medium Industries 
Development Corporation (SMIDEC) in 1996 that a consistent and full-scale SME support 
policy was planned and implemented in Malaysia - which was after arriving at the mature 
stage of electronics industrialisation. This timing clearly raises an important question about 
the contribution and effectiveness of Malaysian SME policy in the creation of linkages 
between SMEs and large foreign firms. The following section will examine this question 
from the historical point of view.
3. The Development of Malaysian SME Support Policies
Phase I (1957 - mid 1970s): Scant Support for SMEs
　　For a decade after independence in 1957, no major government support programmes 
designed specifically for SMEs were planned or prepared, and until 1970 no specific 
incentives were provided to SMEs (Fong 1990, 156). The prime objective of the government 
at this time was relatively easy industrialisation centred on the establishment of large 
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resource-based enterprises. However, the traditional rubber and tin, and later palm oil, 
industries gave some stimulation to the development of primitive types of workshops and 
foundries, especially in the sectors of processing and machinery fabrication and repairs 
(Thoburn 1977).
　　During the 1960s, while Malaysia was focussing on resource-based industrialisation, the 
first SME support programmes were officially mentioned in the First Malaysia Plan (1966-
70). However, this SME ＂support＂ was largely verbal and lacked substance (Chee 1986). As 
is clearly indicated by the introduction of the Investment Incentives Act of 1968, the 
government＇s political emphasis was still on nurturing large enterprises by attracting more 
FDI. However, this stance was modified when the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
launched in 1971 in response to the 1969 race riots - and reaffirmed in subsequent five-year 
National Development Plans. The important role that SMEs played in the Malaysian 
economy first received political attention in these plans in the sense that development of 
SMEs was expected to contribute to the economy in modernisation, generating employment 
and income, and reducing poverty and economic imbalance among different ethnic groups 
(Meyanathan & Salleh 1994). The government＇s attention to SME promotion and 
programmes was exclusively focused on the development of indigenous, i.e., Bumiputera, 
entrepreneurs. Several minor SME agencies were set up, such as the Coordinating Council 
for Development of Small-scale Industries (CCDSI), in order to provide support exclusively 
to Bumiputera enterprises (Chee 1986).
Phase II (mid 70s - mid 80s): Emphasis on Bumiputera Support
　　Until the early 1980s, Malaysia＇s SME policies were conducted along the lines of the 
political philosophy embodied in the NEP. The Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985) provided 
the most comprehensive listing of government guidelines for SME development to that time. 
These guidelines emphasised, among other things, the following three points (Moha Asri 
1999a):
　i) SMEs should not duplicate activities already undertaken by larger-scale enterprises, 
and preference should be given to SMEs which complement the activities of larger-
scale businesses;
　ii) the selection of industries must satisfy the need to achieve the New Economic 
Policy, particularly in encouraging Bumiputera participation in business and other 
commercial activities; and
　iii) the promotion of SMEs should be considered an integral part of the overall 
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development of the manufacturing sector.
These guidelines clearly place SMEs in a complementary position to the development of 
large firms. At the same time, SMEs were expected to become a major vehicle to improve 
the economic position of Bumiputera entrepreneurs.
　　Regarding the development of the institutional framework, an important step was the 
establishment of the Division of Small Enterprise (DSE) under the MITI in 1981, whose sole 
responsibility was to look after the interests of Malaysian-owned SMEs. Its fundamental 
function was to harmonise and coordinate the policies and strategies formerly conducted in 
an uncoordinated manner by various government agencies involved in SME development. 
The main functions of this division can be summarised as follows (Hashim 2000):
　i) to study and evaluate the existing and forthcoming policies for the development of 
SMEs;
　ii) to identify opportunities in industries for involvement of SMEs;
　iii) to provide advice and guidance to entrepreneurs on policies and programmes 
implemented by government agencies through conferences, dialogues, talks, and 
workshops;
　iv) to collect and distribute publications on projects, studies, and pamphlets on SMEs; 
and
　v) to create and implement specific programmes for the development of small firms.
Bumiputera participation was still implicitly stressed in implementing DSE policies.
　　From the point of view of linkage formation, Malaysian SME policies in the 1970s and 
early 1980s have two negative implications. First, the policies were basically ＂inward-
looking,＂ ＂import substituting,＂ and ＂domestic-market oriented,＂ because they concentrated 
on promoting Bumiputera enterprises. As is shown in Table 3, the major products of 
Bumiputera SMEs were processed items such as food, furniture, and miscellaneous goods 
which mainly served domestic markets or, at best, replaced imported consumer goods under 
tariff protection. Consequently, the development of Bumiputera SMEs was weakly correlated 
with the growing presence of foreign affiliates in FTZs. Second, the political emphasis on 
Bumiputera participation was inconsistent with unleashing the full potential of Malaysian 
SME development. The Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) of 1975 required local firms 
(with equity above RM 250,000 or a full-time workforce of more than 24 persons) to comply 
with Bumiputera ownership and employment targets. This caused a great deal of 
inconvenience and uncertainty in the investment environment for non-Bumiputera, 
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particularly Chinese, entrepreneurs, who were the majority of industrial capitalists in 
Malaysia. Fong (1990) illustrates the importance of non-Bumiputera industrialists by citing 
the following episode. In 1980, the World Bank provided a loan of US$100 million to the 
Malaysian government specifically for the financing of Bumiputera small enterprises. In 
spite of the numerous incentives that accompanied the loan, however, Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs were slow and few to respond; as a result, only ten percent of the financing 
target was achieved by 1986. The requirements then had to be relaxed to allow non-
Bumiputera SMEs to apply so that full use could be made of the fund (Fong 1990, 158).
Phase III (mid 80s - mid 90s): Forced Creation of Linkages
　　By the early 1980s, several structural problems associated with SME support policies 
were becoming clearer in Malaysia (Chee 1987, Fong 1990, Lall 1996). First, the great 
majority of local SMEs were in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis large local enterprises, 
including TNCs. For example, most SMEs were too small in employee numbers and capital 
to be able to take advantage of the Investment Incentives Act of 1968. Second, the 
development of non-Bumiputera SMEs was hindered by the ICA 1975 requirements for 
enterprises employing more than 24 full-time workers. These requirements discouraged 
local SMEs, especially local Chinese-owned firms, from making further investment in capital 
and human resources (Stoever 1986). Third, the increasing focus of local SMEs, especially 
Bumiputera companies, on domestic market-oriented products prevented them from 
reaping larger benefits from the outward-oriented industrialisation taking place in Malaysia. 
Because of these structural problems, the development of local SMEs lagged far behind and 
was largely disconnected from the successful development of the country＇s export-oriented 
industries. As a result, the slow growth of the SME sector became a bottleneck that slowed 
further development and upgrading of the Malaysian economy (Moha Asri 1999a).
　　These structural problems were intensified when the Malaysian economy suffered from 
a serious economic recession in the mid-1980s. To overcome recession, the government 
sought to attract more TNCs in order to aggressively pursue further export-oriented 
growth (Edwards & Jomo 1993). To work productively with such TNCs, which required 
meeting their quality standards, local SMEs were expected to produce more overseas-
oriented and high-quality output. Thus, to hasten Malaysian SME development, well-
functioning SME support programmes were seriously needed (Meyanathan & Salleh 1994).
　　The Malaysian government gradually became acutely aware of the adverse effects of 
the ICA on the expansion, development, modernisation, and technological upgrading of local 
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SMEs (FMM 2011). Based on this awareness, in 1986 the ICA ceiling was raised to RM 1.0 
million or a full-time work force of 49 workers. Thanks to this amendment, a significant 
proportion of SMEs no longer had to officially comply with the NEP guidelines. In addition 
to this liberalisation, the Investment Incentive Act of 1968 was replaced by the Promotion of 
Investment Act in 1986, under which the minimum capital requirements for enjoying 
incentives were removed. As a result, all SMEs became entitled to benefit from incentives 
such as tax exemptions, pioneer status, reinvestment allowance for facility expansion, and 
other advantages. Industrial policies after the mid-1980s thus emphasised the development 
of all Malaysian SMEs, regardless of whether they were Bumiputera or non-Bumiputera 
(Meyanathan & Salleh 1994).
　　The launch of the First Industrial Master Plan (IMP1) in 1985 was an important 
milestone in the history of Malaysian industrialisation. IMP1 was intended to encourage 
further development of export-oriented industry (e.g., electronics) and, at the same time, to 
launch import-substituting heavy industrialisation (e.g., automobiles) in Malaysia. IMP1 was 
also critical for the development of Malaysian SMEs, as one of its key elements was to 
modernise ancillary firms and strengthen industrial linkages. Local SMEs that supplied the 
strategic sectors became a government target for nurturing; for this purpose, IMP1 
proposed policy support programmes for SME expansion and modernisation via the 
provision of financial assistance, improvement of the incentive system, and promotion of 
R&D activities (MITI 1986).
　　IMP1 was characterised by two parallel pillars of economic policy: further liberalisation 
for export-oriented industries and heavy government intervention in the automobile 
industries (Jomo & Edwards 1993). In line with the first pillar, the incentives for SMEs 
were further strengthened in the 1989 budget by according ＇pioneer＇ status automatically to 
all SMEs producing output from a list of designated products, such as electronics items. The 
1989 budget also addressed many other measures that discriminated against SMEs. For 
example, large enterprises located in FTZs were allowed to import components duty-free, a 
privilege that had not been accorded to local SMEs. This asymmetry distorted costs to the 
extent that, for TNCs, locally-produced items were more expensive than imported ones, 
which the 1989 budget corrected by extending the exemptions from import duties for raw 
materials, components, and parts to SMEs (Meyanathan & Salleh 1994).
　　In the automobile industry, the Vendor Development Programme (VDP) introduced in 
1988 encouraged the emergence of Bumiputera suppliers to Proton, a national car maker 
established in 1983. Under this scheme, Proton was designated as the ＂anchor firm,＂ which 
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obliged it to purchase as many components as possible from qualified Bumiputera SMEs 
(called the ＂vendors＂) and at the same time to provide Bumiputera vendors with technical 
and financial assistance. In return, the anchor firm received various benefits from the 
government, including fiscal incentives and the approval of a large number of expatriate 
work permits (Felker & Jomo 2007). The VDP was later expanded to more anchor firms, 
including large electronics firms. This was a semi-forced linkage creation scheme, to which 
the anchor firms were pressured by the government to contribute. Partly due to the lack of 
economic rationality and efficiency this SME support system was considered to have 
achieved only limited success in nurturing competitive local suppliers (Ungku et al. 1998, 
Felker & Jomo 2007).
Phase IV (after the mid-90s): Upgrading SMEs through Cluster-based Development
　　After the launch of IMP1, the Malaysian government continued to put greater effort 
into strengthening the performance of local SMEs by introducing a number of support 
programmes and incentives covering a wide spectrum of SME needs. In addition to the 
issue of creating competitive linkages with large TNCs, several other new challenges 
emerged for Malaysian SMEs, including access to international markets, enhancing 
technological capabilities, adoption of information and communication technology (ICT), and 
increasing access to finance. Such new dimensions for SME development called for a 
broader policy framework, which was embodied in the Second Industrial Master Plan 
(IMP2) for the period 1996 to 2005 (MITI 1996).
　　IMP2 formulated two key concepts: ＂cluster-based industrial development＂ and 
＂manufacturing plus-plus.＂ These aimed to enhance growth of the manufacturing sector as 
a whole throughout the entire value chain. ＂Cluster-based industrial development＂ regarded 
industrial development as a broad system including not only supporting manufacturers but 
also supporting services, R&D, human skills, infrastructure, institutions, and other economic 
actors. ＂Manufacturing plus-plus＂ was concerned with upgrading each industry＇s capabilities 
in order to achieve more value-added at each node along the value chain. IMP2 called for 
SMEs to play a vital role in supporting national industrial development throughout the 
value chains linked with large global firms. These concepts were applied to eight target 
industries, including electrical and electronics industries (MITI 1996).
　　Regarding institutional change, the Division of Small Enterprise (DSE) was upgraded 
to the Small and Medium Industry Development Corporation (SMIDEC) in May 1996. The 
establishment of SMIDEC was epoch-making in the history of Malaysian SME support 
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policies. It was expected to play a major role in coordinating the various assistance 
programmes related to SME development. DES had been set up to fulfil a similar 
responsibility, but it was no more than a very small division within MITI with insufficient 
resources to carry out its various programmes. Because numerous different divisions and 
agencies were involved in SME policies, there was a lack of direction, consistency, effective 
planning, and systematic policy formation (Shanmugan 1988). Moreover, DSE＇s orientation 
was concentrated on domestic market-oriented Bumiputera companies. SMIDEC was 
Malaysia＇s first one-stop agency for coordinating all SME-related programmes.
　　The establishment of SMIDEC was in line with the recognition of the need for a 
specialised agency to further promote the development of all SMEs as an integral part of 
nationwide industrialisation. The main tasks of this agency are, among others: i) to co-
ordinate the overall development of SMEs in Malaysia, ii) to promote the development of 
modern and sophisticated indigenous SMEs in tandem with the strategic direction of 
industrial development, and iii) to develop Malaysian SMEs into an efficient and competitive 
sector, capable of producing high value-added and quality products, components, and 
related services for the global market (Felker & Jomo 2007).
　　Under the supervision of SMIDEC, which worked with other government agencies, 
various programmes and financial assistance schemes were introduced. Among these, the 
Industrial Linkage Programme (ILP) and the Global Supplier Programme (GSP) were 
widely used４）. These programmes were closely related to the development and upgrading 
of SMEs in the electrical and electronics sectors. As of 2002, 953 SMEs were registered in 
the ILP, among which more than half (50.1%) belonged to E&E sectors, 14.8% to 
automotive, 24.8% to machinery and engineering, and 24.8% to resource-based industries 
(VDF 2011)５）. These figures highlight the relative success of linkage formation in the 
electrical and electronics sector.
　　In summary, Malaysian SME support policy has evolved substantially. For a time after 
independence, there was no political awareness of the need to support local SMEs. With the 
４）The Industrial Linkage Programme (ILP) is characterised as a cluster-based industrial development 
programme prioritising electrical and electronics engineering and resource-based sectors. The main 
services the ILP provided were (i) financial incentives, (ii) business matching, and (iii) provision of 
industrial sites. The Global Supplier Programme (GSP) aimed to enhance the capacity and capability of 
local SMEs to compete at global standards, by providing training in critical skills under linkage with 
large anchor firms (Ndubisi & Saleh 2006, 21).
５）These percentages add up to more than 100% as there were several companies belonging to more 
than one sector.
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formulation of the NEP, SME support policy was implemented as a means of Bumiputera 
entrepreneurial development. This was partially successful, but the development of local 
SMEs was largely disconnected from export-oriented industrialisation. Moreover, the great 
majority of non-Bumiputera and tiny SMEs were not only ineligible for incentives but also 
had to comply with ICA requirements which tended to hinder their further growth. Such 
problems led to a shift in political direction. From the mid-1980s, driven principally by the 
IMP1 initiative, SME promotion policies were strengthened, liberalised, and made more 
comprehensive. In 1996, SMIDEC was established as an overarching government agency to 
organise, supervise, and control all SME policies and administration.
　　The development of Malaysian manufacturing SMEs has been remarkable in terms of 
its contribution to employment and value-added in the Malaysian economy, particularly 
considering its near-zero starting point at the time of independence. As a result, and despite 
criticism of the overlapping and distorted system of planning and implementing SME 
support policies, Malaysia has often been lauded for its SME performance (Moha Asri & 
Bakar 2000, Harvie & Lee 2008). It is debatable, however, how much of this good 
performance can be attributed to the government＇s SME support policies.
　　First, as mentioned above, Malaysian SME support policy has been unduly distorted for 
several non-economic reasons. The Investment Incentive Act of 1968 placed SMEs at a 
great disadvantage relative to large firms until 1986. In addition, until the mid-1980s, the 
policy was strongly ethnically biased - focused predominantly on the development of 
Bumiputera companies, most of which were in domestic-oriented sectors such as food, 
furniture production, and services and had few links with export-oriented large firms. 
Supporting industries producing electric parts, plastic, metal stamping, moulds, engineering, 
and precision tools were populated mainly by non-Bumiputera, particularly Chinese-
Malaysian, firms, whose exclusion from various incentive programmes for a long time may 
have prevented the full potential of Malaysian SMEs from being realised.
　　Second, there is the issue of timing: the belated advent of SMIDEC in 1996. Before that, 
Malaysian SME policies were regarded as inconsistent, disorganised, inefficient, insufficiently 
resourced, and weak in planning and implementation, problems which the launch of 
SMIDEC as a well-resourced one-stop coordination agency was intended to solve (Felker 
& Jomo 2007). Its establishment meant that substantial support programmes were more 
widely and easily available to local SMEs than ever before (Moha Asri 1999a). However, 
Malaysian electronics industrialisation began as early as the 1970s or, at the latest, in the 
early 1980s. This means that the SMEs that became suppliers to TNCs before the mid-
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1990s and built the foundation of Malaysia＇s electronics industrialisation developed mostly 
by their own efforts, without any significant government support. SMEs which received 
generous support from SMIDEC appeared only after Malaysian electronics industrialisation 
was on a stable track, casting doubt on the true contribution the government＇s SME support 
schemes.
4. SME Support Schemes: Principles and Malaysian Practice
As of 1999, 13 ministries and nearly 30 government institutions/agencies were involved in 
offering a wide variety of programmes to promote the development of Malaysian SMEs 
(Hashim 2002). For analytical purposes, it is convenient to divide these programmes into 
four broad areas: (i) financial assistance; (ii) training and technical support; (iii) extension 
and advisory services; and (iv) provision of public goods such as infrastructure facilities 
(Moha Asri 1999a, Bennett 2014). This section briefly reviews the theoretical basis and 
design of these four types of programme, while the following section will investigate their 
actual impact on Penang＇s E&E industrialisation.
4 (i) Financial assistance
　　Lack of or limited access to sources of institutional financial credit is recognised as a 
major obstacle to the initial start-up and subsequent growth of SMEs (Beck & Asli 2006). 
Major types of financial support activities include credit at an interest rate lower than the 
market rate, direct subsidies, tax exemptions, and customs relief (Cassar 2004). Along with 
substantial credit guarantees, governments sometime oblige public and even private banks 
to allocate a minimum proportion of their lending to target SMEs, at low interest rates and 
with longer payback terms than usual.
　　In theory, financial assistance is justified for two reasons: market failure and public 
welfare (Storey 1994, Bridge et al. 2003, Bennett 2008, 2014). First, financial markets are 
rarely perfect and far-sighted, and may fail to correctly identify which infant firms have 
growth potential. This tends to create information asymmetry, which results in such firms 
having lower levels of financial resources to deploy than would be socially optimal. This 
kind of market failure is especially frequent in developing countries (Fall 1989), and 
governments are often expected to take the risk of filling this finance gap. Second, from the 
perspective of social welfare enhancement, it is often considered desirable that financially 
weak firms─in an economically disadvantageous position vis-a-vis large or foreign 
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enterprises─should be subsidised by public bodies. These two reasons often form the 
justification for government policies of financial support for SMEs.
　　In Malaysia, under the overall administration of MITI (Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry), MIDF (Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Berhad６）) is the central 
agency in charge of SME finance. Launched in 1960, MIDF introduced soft loan schemes to 
aid SMEs, such as the Soft Loan for Small and Medium Enterprises (SLSME) and Soft Loan 
for Factory Relocation (SLFR) programmes. According to the mid-term review of the 
Eighth Malaysia Plan 2001-2005 (Government of Malaysia 2003), 73% of the total of RM100 
million allocated for this purpose was approved for 68 projects. Furthermore, Bank Negara, 
the Central Bank of Malaysia, formed a special SME unit in 2003 which was to work with 
the SME Bank, established in 2005 under the control of the Ministry of Finance, to facilitate 
application and approval processes (Ndubisi & Saleh 2006, Ch.3).
4 (ii) Training and technical support
　　Successful industrialisation is always based on a large pool of capable and forward-
looking entrepreneurs, managers, engineers, and workers who can play a dynamic role in 
driving sound economic development (Pillai 1994). Such a labour force is valuable not only 
to small companies but also to large ones. In developing countries, however, it is especially 
critical for SMEs that aim to compete in global markets in which only qualified and 
competent firms can survive. Government can play a central role in providing high-quality 
and affordable education and training programmes. Theoretically, education and training are 
regarded as public goods with significant positive externalities, whose supply under free 
market mechanisms tends to be lower than is socially optimal. This is the justification for 
government-supplied training and technical support (Storey & Westhead 1997).
　　Training programmes can be broadly divided into two types (Moha Asri 1999a). The 
first is entrepreneurial development training, which is provided to potential, often novice, 
entrepreneurs who wish to start new businesses and get them running on a steady track 
(Kuratko 2005). These programmes include study of how to create and develop business 
plans, how to identify and access financial resources and potential markets, how to develop 
and manage human resources, how to analyse business models, and basic management 
skills.
　　The second type of training and technical support is technical skill development 
６）Berhad (BHD) is a suffix used in Malaysia to indicate a public limited company, while. another suffix, 
Sendirian Berhad (SDN BHD) is also used to denote a private limited company in Malaysia.
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programmes provided for engineers and operators of SMEs (Gibb 1997). These programmes 
are designed to improve various technical aspects of basic operational skills such as machine 
handling, processing techniques, equipment and tool selection, handling processes, and other 
manufacturing techniques. In a broader sense, formal education provides a basis for and 
encompasses these two types of training.
　　In Malaysia, several skill development programmes are offered by SMIDEC. These are 
designed to raise the level of competitiveness and productivity of Malaysian SMEs by 
upgrading their technological capacity in, for example, ICT, automation, and efficient 
manufacturing processes. For this purpose, technology advisory services and research and 
development programmes are offered with grant provisions (Ndubisi & Saleh 2006, Ch.3). 
At the local government level, the Penang Skills Development Centre (PSDC) is regarded 
as a highly successful example (Rasiah 1996, 2017). It provides various kinds of training to 
workers, employees, and managers sent from member companies, financed by the Human 
Resource Development Fund (HRDF). The PSDC is examined in greater detail in 4 (i) of 
this section.
4 (iii) Extension and advisory services
　　Advisory services are follow-up assistance provided to entrepreneurs who have already 
started new businesses (Robson & Bennett 2000, Bennett 2008) or to the managers of 
existing SMEs. The small size of SMEs puts them at a disadvantage compared to large 
firms in developing potential markets and conducting effective marketing activities. SMEs 
also suffer from a shortage of resources for capturing accurate, broad, and professional 
information. These disadvantages are seen as justification for government support.
　　Generally, three types of these services may be defined (Moha Asri 1999a). The first is 
management consultancy services, including seminars and short courses that teach 
professional management skills. These are helpful for upgrading business skills such as 
financial planning, strategy, human resource management, and other general management 
related activities.
　　The second type of extension and advisory service is courses related to marketing and 
market research. These cover topics such as identifying market opportunities, marketing 
strategy, product innovation and development, attractive packaging design, assessing target 
customers＇ buying habits, price promotion, and distribution strategies. The focus is largely 
on market-orientation programmes that encourage SMEs to manufacture exports, though 
they provide useful information on potential domestic as well as overseas markets. In 
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Malaysia, MATRADE (Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation) plays the 
export-promoting role, providing overseas market information, opportunities to attend 
overseas exhibitions, and grants for overseas market research. These advisory services also 
promote greater linkages, especially vertical integration with large firms (Hashim 2015).
　　The third type of extension and advisory service is courses related to product quality, 
design, and quality improvement, and to public assistance for obtaining ISO industrial 
certification. ISO is an internationally-recognised quality control certification system, which 
can be an important tool for prompting industry to undertake greater self-assessment of 
production capabilities, identify needs, and seek resources for improvement. The Malaysian 
government has achieved considerable success in expanding ISO certification among local 
manufacturing companies through the Standards and Industrial Research Institute of 
Malaysia, or SIRIM (Ho 1995). SIRIM plays an important role in helping SMEs to improve 
quality control and productivity. As described below, SIRIM is one of the most widely-used 
certificate systems in Malaysia for demonstrating quality assurance (World Bank 1997).
4 (iv) Provision of infrastructure and related services
　　The economic benefits of agglomeration in local or regional industrial clusters including 
both SMEs and large enterprises are widely acknowledged (Schmitz & Nadvi 1999, Best 
2007). Geographical proximity is advantageous in reducing logistics costs and in enabling 
face-to-face contact among companies that allows collaborative work to be carried out 
efficiently. Productivity is also enhanced by good local infrastructure, including roads, 
electricity and water supply, container terminals, telecommunications, testing facilities, and 
well-designed factory premises, and by ＂real services＂ provided by local business 
associations (Schmitz & Musyck 1994). Where agglomeration and strong infrastructure are 
lacking, scattered firms incur extra costs of operation and travel time between companies, 
diminishing overall productivity and limiting growth potential. This provides convincing 
justification for the setting up of infrastructure and industrial estates which facilitate the 
agglomeration process (Lee 2011).
　　In theory, the provision of infrastructure is a core responsibility of government (Mody 
1996). One reason for government involvement is that free-rider problems tend to make its 
supply through market mechanisms lower than would be socially optimal. A second reason 
is that providing infrastructure in developing countries shapes industrial development by 
powerfully influencing the type and quality of private investments needed to meet public 
objectives. To invite and support target enterprises in an industrial zone, for example, 
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governments usually combine right of tenancy with special incentives and support measures 
such as provision of industrial premises for fees lower than market rate, commonly-shared 
production facilities, privileged supply of raw materials and services, exclusive government 
consulting services, marketing outlets, and specialised technical services (Oman 2000). 
Typical examples are free trade zone privileges such as tax holidays and duty-free status. 
Such government support is as important and helpful to local SMEs as it is for larger firms, 
and perhaps even more so, since they are smaller and weaker.
5. Conclusion: The Role of Government in Supporting SMEs
　　This paper examines the history and nature of government support programmes for 
SME development in Malaysia. In line with NEP objectives, early SME policy was designed 
to increase Bumiputera participation. However, pro-Bumiputera stipulations have been 
gradually relaxed. At the same time, SME support schemes have been steadily enhanced 
and better organised. The establishment of SMIDEC in 1996 was a landmark in the history 
of Malaysian SME policy, as this agency effectively integrated and organised various 
functions and policies which had previously been run by a number of different agencies and 
institutes in a decentralised manner.
　　The general view of the Malaysian government＇s programmes to support SME 
development is that they were successful and widely appreciated (Meyanathan & Salleh 
1994, Harvie & Lee 2008, Tambunan 2009). The programmes and services surely enhanced 
the overall productivity of companies and contributed positively to the business climate. 
However, legitimate doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the government 
support. The most convincing evidence of the programmes＇ limited impact is the fact that a 
large number of SMEs have demonstrated an ability and strong motivation to go into 
business and have struggled successfully for survival with no, or very little, support from 
the government (Oikawa 2021). In particular, no special programmes were available for 
start-up SMEs. If government policies had been more favourable for SMEs by providing 
more adequate financing, technical assistance, and extension and advisory services to 
promising start-ups at the right moment, the growth and development of SMEs would have 
been greater and more prosperous. Taking from the cases in Penang, this issue will be 
elaborately examined in Oikawa (2021).
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